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Abstract 
 
In two field studies, we explore the impact of providing employees and teammates with 
prosocial bonuses, a novel type of bonus spent on others rather than on oneself. In 
Experiment 1, we show that prosocial bonuses in the form of donations to charity lead to 
happier and more satisfied employees at an Australian bank. In Experiment 2, we show that 
prosocial bonuses in the form of expenditures on teammates lead to better performance in 
both pharmaceutical sales teams in Belgium and sports teams in Canada. These results 
suggest that a minor adjustment to employee bonuses – shifting the focus from the self to 
others – can produce measurable benefits for employees and organizations.   
 
Keywords: bonuses, prosocial behavior, job performance, job satisfaction, motivation, teams, 
happiness 
                   
 
 
Introduction 
A recent survey revealed that just 46% of Americans are satisfied with their jobs, the 
lowest level recorded by the Conference Board [1] in the past two decades. Yet over the same 
time frame, Americans have come to spend more and more of their time at work [2]. Taken 
together, this trend suggests that employees are becoming more and more unhappy more and 
more of the time at work, hardly a formula for a healthy and productive workplace. In this 
increasingly negative environment, how can employers incentivize their employees to increase 
their happiness, job satisfaction, and ultimately their job performance? 
Certainly, designing effective incentive schemes is a central challenge for a wide range of 
organizations, from multi-national corporations to academic departments. In pursuit of 
identifying the most effective strategies, organizations have devised an impressive variety of 
such bonuses, from fixed salaries to pay-per-performance, from commissions to end-of-year 
bonuses. We suggest that the wide variety in such schemes masks a shared assumption: That the 
best way to motivate employees is to reward them with money that they then spend on 
themselves. We propose an alternative means of incentivizing employees – what we term 
“prosocial bonuses” – in which organizations provide employees with bonuses used to engage in 
prosocial actions towards charities and co-workers.  
Below, we first review research exploring existing methods of increasing workplace 
performance, including individual-based and team-based bonus schemes, which tend to reveal 
both benefits and unexpected costs. We then briefly review the literature on the benefits of 
improving social life in the work place, such as increasing employee citizenship behaviors. Next, 
we argue that prosocial bonuses mitigate some of the issues that arise with individual- and team-
based compensation schemes, while retaining the benefits of improving employee’s social lives                   
 
 
in the workplace. Finally, we examine the impact of these prosocial bonuses on employee 
satisfaction and team performance, by reporting results from two “proof of concept” field 
experiments conducted in three countries. 
Individual- and Team-Based Incentive Schemes 
When asked why they work, individuals most commonly reply “money” [3]. But what is 
the effect of money on employee’s job satisfaction and performance? On one hand, monetary 
bonuses have been found to have positive effects – increased productivity, effort, performance, 
and job satisfaction [4-9]. Individual bonuses increase job satisfaction in part because employees 
see their time and effort being rewarded [10-13]. From pay-per-performance to piece rate 
compensation schemes to profit sharing to bonuses, individual-based incentive schemes can lead to 
improved employee outcomes [8, 14-18].  
On the other hand, individual incentives – such as large bonuses – are often surprisingly 
ineffective in increasingly employee morale and productivity [19-20]. Rewarding individual 
employees can produce negative outcomes by eroding workplace cohesion [21], as employees 
become reluctant to share information with others even at the expense of reduced output [22]. 
Relative comparisons at the individual level create competition which results in decreased trust, 
sharing and teamwork [23-25]; in Drago and Turnbull [26], for example, tournament-based 
compensation led to decreased helping behavior and increased the potential for sabotaging other 
workers.  
In an effort to prevent such negative competitive dynamics that can result from 
individual-based bonuses, organizations often turn to incentivizing employees for their collective 
performance, encouraging cooperation and teamwork rather than competition [27-29]. Indeed, a 
growing body of research suggests that interpersonal relationships enable employees to                   
 
 
experience their work as important and meaningful [30-36]. Furthermore, evidence suggests that 
interpersonal relationships often enhance employees’ motivations, opportunities, and resources at 
work [37-40]. Positive interpersonal relationships with coworkers provide social support and a 
buffer from stressful events [41-43], which in turn predict team commitment [44], job 
engagement [45-46], and job satisfaction [47-49].  
In some cases, team-based compensation schemes have been shown to raise this sense of 
cooperation and cohesiveness between team members [22,50], inducing them to exert additional 
effort toward helping one another [51-54] Importantly, such increased cooperation due to 
interdependent rewards has been shown to improve team performance [55], suggesting that 
team-based bonuses may be an effective means of improving employee social life. As with 
individual-based bonuses, however, team-based bonuses offer important advantages but also 
potential drawbacks – such as free riding [56], motivational loss due to the perception of inequity 
[57], and suboptimization of team goals [58]. Thus while team-based bonuses have the potential 
to improve relationships between co-workers, they can also lead to “antisocial” behaviors – and 
decreased employee outcomes. 
Prosocial Bonuses 
We suggest that prosocial bonuses offer an alternative approach that has the potential to 
provide some of the same benefits as team-based compensation – increased social support, 
cohesion, and performance – while carrying fewer drawbacks. Research suggests that the desire 
to help others is a need deeply rooted in human nature [59-60], and that giving to others has a 
causal impact on increasing happiness and life satisfaction [61-62]. At the organizational level, 
previous correlational research suggests that prosocial behavior in the workplace – often termed 
citizenship behaviors – is linked to employee morale and performance [63]: the extent to which                   
 
 
employees perceive themselves and their organizations as prosocial predicts organizational 
commitment [64-66]. We suggest that prosocial bonuses can have a causal impact on employee 
satisfaction and performance, such that providing employees with money to help others would 
have a greater organizational impact than providing employees with money to spend on 
themselves. 
We note that we are not the first researchers to examine the interplay of incentives and 
prosocial behavior; indeed, several investigations point to the potential risk in mixing money 
with altruism [67]: paying children to collect money for charity decreases their efforts [68], 
publicly rewarding adults for earning money for charity also decreases effort [69], and paying 
friends to help with a move reduces the amount of help received [70].Unlike these kinds of 
“prosocial incentives,” however, the prosocial bonuses we provide in the experiments below are 
not contingent upon or linked to any behavior – employees are simply given money by the firm 
to spend prosocially. In this sense, our investigation uses a version of a “reciprocity by proxy” 
strategy outlined by Goldstein, Griskevicius, and Cialdini [71]. In this investigation, guests who 
were informed that a hotel had already given a donation to an environmental cause were more 
likely to reuse their towels than those who were told the hotel would make a donation only if they 
reused their towels; their results showed that providing the prosocial incentive up front was more 
effective than linking the incentive directly to the behavior. Following this logic, we predicted 
that offering employees prosocial bonuses that were not linked to any current behavior or 
expectation of future behavior would be effective in increasing employee satisfaction. 
Overview of the Present Research 
We examine whether randomly assigning employees to engage in prosocial behavior – 
via prosocial bonuses – can have a causal impact on employee well-being, job satisfaction, and                   
 
 
job performance. In both field studies, some employees and teammates are given non-contingent 
“prosocial bonuses” – money that they receive as a windfall that they are encouraged to spend in 
a prosocial manner. In Experiment 1, we give some employees of a company the opportunity to 
donate money to charity, examining the impact of this intervention on both employee well-being 
and job satisfaction. In Experiment 2, we move beyond assessment of psychological constructs 
to behavioral measures; by comparing prosocial versus personal bonuses, we investigate their 
impact on team performance in the two different contexts of sales teams and sports teams. 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement 
Data collection for Experiment 1 was approved by the Harvard University Behavioral 
Research Ethics Board. Data collection for Experiment 2 was approved by the University of 
British Columbia’s Behavioral Research Ethics Board (B06-0557). Written informed consent 
was obtained for all studies. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we examine the impact of prosocial bonuses on the most widely studied 
attitude in the field of organizational behavior, job satisfaction – broadly defined, employees’ 
subjective evaluation of their work experience [72-73]. The large number of investigations 
examining the factors that influence job satisfaction have tended to focus on two fundamental 
determinants: aspects of employees and their lives such as individual differences in self-esteem 
or education as well as individual experiences outside of work [74-78], and aspects of the job 
itself, such as communicating clear task goals and giving feedback when those goals are 
achieved [79-84]. We assigned some employees of a large bank to receive a prosocial bonus in                   
 
 
the form of money from the company to donate to charity, and examined the impact of spending 
this bonus on job satisfaction, compared to employees not given this bonus. 
Participants. A total of 133 employees (59 percent female) at an Australian bank with a 
wide range of income, age, and years at the company completed the experiment (Table 1).
 An 
additional 46 employees completed only the Time 1 survey; these individuals were distributed 
evenly across conditions (Ncontrol = 14, N$50 = 17, and N$100 = 15) and did not differ from our 
main sample in Time 1 happiness or job satisfaction (ts < 1.13, ps > .26). Employees completing 
only the Time 1 survey were not included in the analyses below, leaving  a final sample of 133 
employees (Ncontrol = 48, N$50 = 41, and N$100 = 44).
 
Design and procedure. All employees received an email asking them to participate in an 
experiment on workplace attitudes. Employees were assured that their participation was 
voluntary and that their responses would not be shared with their employer. If employees 
followed a link indicating their willingness to participate, they were directed to the Time 1 
survey. Two weeks later, based on random assignment, employees who had completed the Time 
1 survey were sent an email that either directed them to complete the Time 2 survey (control 
condition), or informed them that the company had given them a charity voucher of 50 or 100 
Australian dollars to donate to a charity of their choice (equivalent to $25 and $50 USD, 
respectively, based on exchange rates at the time). Participants in the two charity voucher 
conditions followed a link that took them to a charity website (KarmaCurrency.com.au) where 
they could donate to a wide range of charities of their choice. After completing the donation, 
participants were automatically redirected to the Time 2 survey. 
Measures. On the Time 1 survey, participants reported their gender, age, and salary.  
Because this was a field experiment conducted during a work day, we asked participants to                   
 
 
complete single-item measures of happiness and job satisfaction at Time 1 and Time 2. 
Participants rated how happy they felt on the 5-point scale (1: very slightly or not at all to 5: 
extremely) used in the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [85]. This single-item measure has 
been previously shown to be highly correlated with the full scale (r = .48, p < .001) [86], and 
similar single-item measures of happiness have been widely used in the well-being literature [87- 
88]. To assess job satisfaction, participants completed a measure drawn from the Michigan 
Organizational Assessment Questionnaire, rating their agreement with the statement “All in all 
I'm satisfied with my job” on a 7-point scale [1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly agree; 89] 
single-item measures of job satisfaction have been shown to correlate with longer assessments, 
and yield adequate validity [90-92]. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed two kinds of psychological benefits that can accrue when 
companies provide employees with the opportunity to spend prosocial bonuses: employees who 
donated $100 to charity on behalf of their company reported increased happiness and job 
satisfaction. Do the benefits of prosocial bonuses extend beyond employee well-being to 
improving actual performance – and the organizations’ bottom line? As with job satisfaction, 
previous research has focused on two categories of predictors of job performance, some 
examining the links between employees’ individual differences (e.g., their general aptitude or 
conscientiousness) and their performance, and other research examining how aspects of the job 
itself can improve or undermine performance [77, 93-96]. We suggest that prosocial bonuses 
offer an additional approach to impacting job performance; we expected that compared to 
personal bonuses, prosocial bonuses would have a larger impact on job performance.                   
 
 
In addition to documenting the impact of prosocial bonuses on team performance, we 
also widened our investigation in three ways.  First, we sought to extend the time course of our 
experiment to examine the longer-term effects of prosocial bonuses. In Experiment 1, we 
measured job satisfaction immediately after the prosocial bonus, which we acknowledge is likely 
when the impact of giving was at its greatest. We assess more delayed or extended benefits of 
prosocial bonuses in Experiment 2. Second, we explored the impact of a different form of 
prosocial bonuses; to do so, we redirected generous spending from external charitable causes to 
co-workers and teammates within the organization. Third, Experiment 1 compared the effects of 
prosocial bonuses to a control condition; in Experiment 2 we directly compared the impact of 
prosocial and personal bonuses, by giving members of some teams money to spend on their 
teammates and members of other teams money to spend on themselves. To maximize our sample 
size and the generalizability of our findings, we ran the same field experiment with two very 
different types of teams: sales teams and sports teams. We first report the results of both 
experiments together, and then report analyses for the two team types separately.  
Sales Teams Methods 
Participants. Following an invitation from their Human Resources department, 88 
salespersons (50 percent male; Mage = 36.0, SD = 6.9) working in 14 teams (Mmembers = 8.6, SD = 
2.0) at a Belgian pharmaceutical company completed this experiment in exchange for a chance to 
win an iPod.
 Participants were assured that participation was voluntary and their responses would 
remain confidential.   
Design and Procedure. Prior to participation, employees provided demographic 
information through an online survey. Each team was then randomly assigned to the prosocial or 
personal bonuses condition.  Because teams varied in size, we randomly selected approximately                   
 
 
one-third of team members and gave them 15 Euros (~$22 USD) to spend by the end of the 
week. On personal bonus teams, participants who received money were asked to spend it on a 
bill, expense, or gift for themselves (as in Dunn et al., 2008), whereas on prosocial bonus teams, 
participants who received money were instructed to spend it on a specified teammate (randomly 
selected from the remaining team members). All participants receiving funds to spend were 
asked to complete the spending by the end of the week. 
Team performance. Performance was assessed immediately before (Time 1) and one 
month after our spending intervention (Time 2).  Pharmaceutical salespeople promote their 
product to physicians, pharmacies, and hospitals, rather than selling directly to customers. As 
such, the standard indicator of pharmaceutical sales team success is the total monthly sales 
collected by each pharmaceutical sales team (in Euros) in the geographical region under their 
purview.  Therefore, we used monthly team sales as our measure of team performance.  
Sports Teams Methods 
Participants. Sixty-two students (83 percent male; Mage = 20.49, SD = 2.6) on 11 
recreational dodge ball teams (Mmembers = 4.71, SD = 1.4) completed the experiment at the 
University of British Columbia for a chance to win $100.   
Procedure. Members of participating teams completed a basic demographics survey in 
which they noted their age, gender, annual income and student status.  Each team was randomly 
assigned to the personal or prosocial bonuses condition. Within each team, approximately one-
third of team members were randomly selected to receive $20 CDN to spend over the subsequent 
week. Participants in the personal bonus condition were instructed to spend the money on a bill, 
expense, or gift for themselves, while participants in the prosocial bonus condition were 
instructed to spend the money on a randomly selected teammate. Both personal and prosocial                   
 
 
spending instructions were presented in written form and then explained by a research assistant 
to ensure participants understood the instructions. Recipients were asked whether they received a 
gift to confirm that the money was spent as declared by the spender.  
Team performance. Performance was assessed with the percentage of games won out of 
total games played on the date of the initial survey (Time 1) and approximately two weeks later 
(Time 2).  As with sales teams, only team level performance could be measured, as individual 
players’ statistics were not collected by the recreational dodge ball league.  
Results 
Experiment 1 
Happiness. A preliminary ANOVA confirmed that there was no difference between 
conditions in Time 1 happiness, F(2, 130) = .12, p > .85, ŋp² = .02; we therefore entered 
experimental condition into an ANCOVA predicting Time 2 happiness, controlling for Time 1 
happiness. We observed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 129) = 5.85, p < .005, ŋp² = 
.08. Follow-up analyses showed that participants who received a $100 charity voucher became 
significantly happier, t(43) = 5.12, p < .001, whereas happiness levels were unchanged from 
Time 1 to Time 2 for those in the control and $50 conditions, ts < 1 (Table 2).  
Job Satisfaction. As with happiness, a preliminary ANOVA confirmed that there were no 
between-group differences in Time 1 job satisfaction, F(2, 130) = .54, p > .77, ŋp² = .004. 
Entering condition into an ANCOVA predicting Time 2 job satisfaction, controlling for Time 1 
job satisfaction, revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 129) = 3.14, p < .05, ŋp² = 
.05. As with happiness, participants who received a $100 charity voucher showed an increase in                   
 
 
job satisfaction, t(43) = 2.46, p < .02, which was unchanged for those in the control and $50 
conditions, ts < 1.19 (Table 2). 
Experiment 2 
Analytic strategy. As with all field experiments with teams, analyzing data at the level of 
the team necessary decreases the number of observations – our 150 total participants become just 
25 observations given the size of the teams we studied. As a result, we standardized performance 
scores from sales and sport teams and analyzed the data jointly to test whether prosocial bonus 
teams outperformed personal bonus teams, while also reporting the results for each context (sales 
and sports) separately. 
Spending examples. Participants who received a personal or prosocial bonus were asked 
to report how they spent the allotted funds. On personal bonus teams, spenders reported buying 
items for themselves such as sportswear, small jewelry, CDs, food, and alcohol. On prosocial 
bonus teams, spenders reported buying items for others such as books, wine, a plant, a stuffed 
animal, a piñata and paying a teammate’s sports league fee.  
Spending condition and team performance. To confirm that there were no significant 
differences in initial performance, we entered condition (personal bonus vs. prosocial bonus), 
team type (pharmaceutical sales vs. dodge ball), and their interaction into an ANOVA predicting 
Time 1 performance; this analysis revealed no significant effects, Fs < 1. As in Experiment 1, 
therefore, we entered the same variables into an ANCOVA predicting Time 2 performance, 
controlling for Time 1 performance. As predicted, we found a significant main effect, whereby 
prosocial bonus teams performed significantly better than personal bonus teams, F(1, 20) = 4.34, 
p = .05, ŋp² = .18 (Table 3).                    
 
 
The interaction between team type and condition was marginally significant, F(1, 20) = 
3.84, p = .06, ŋp² = .16. Although this interaction and the simple effects should be interpreted 
with caution given the very small sample sizes, closer examination suggests that prosocial 
bonuses were especially effective for sales teams. That is, in the prosocial bonuses condition, 
sales teams showed a large and significant increase in performance from Time 1 to Time 2, t(6) = 
2.70, p < .04, d = 1.02,  while sports teams showed a large, but statistically marginally significant 
increase,  t(5) = 1.87, p = .12, d = .76. Meanwhile, in the personal bonuses condition, there was 
no evidence for a performance improvement for either sales teams, t(6) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .04, 
or sports teams, t(4) = 0.39, p = .72, d = .17 (Table 3).  
Another way to conceptualize the effectiveness of these interventions is to calculate the 
return on investment for prosocial and personal bonuses. On sales teams, for every 10€ given to a 
team member to spend on herself, the firm gets just 3€ back – a net loss; because sales do not 
increase with personal bonuses, personal bonuses are wasted money. In sharp contrast, for every 
10€ given to a team member to spend prosocially, the firm reaps 52€. Similarly for sports teams, 
every $10 people spent on themselves led to a two percent decrease in winning percentage, 
whereas every $10 spent prosocially led to an 11% increase in winning percentage.  
Discussion 
We offer initial evidence of the causal impact of increasing prosocial behavior via the 
provision of prosocial bonuses to employees at an Australian bank, members of dodge ball teams 
in Canada, and pharmaceutical salespeople in Belgium. Taken together, our studies show that 
when organizations give employees the opportunity to spend money on others – whether their 
co-workers or those in need – both the employees and the company can benefit, with increased 
happiness and job satisfaction and even improved team performance. Specifically, in Experiment                   
 
 
1, employees who had the opportunity to make a substantial donation to charity ($100 AUD) on 
behalf of their company reported enhanced happiness and job satisfaction in the short term, 
compared to those in the control condition. In Experiment 2, we extended these findings to team 
performance in the longer term, showing that teams performed better when participants were 
assigned to spend money on their fellow team members than when given a more standard bonus: 
money to spend on themselves. Across the studies, we show that prosocial bonuses can benefit 
both individuals and teams, on both psychological and “bottom line” indicators, in both the short 
and long-term. Unlike some research suggesting a weak link between factors that improve job 
satisfaction and those that improve job performance [97-99] our results suggest that prosocial 
bonuses have a meaningful impact on both metrics.  
How might prosocial bonuses lead to increased happiness, job satisfaction and team 
performance? Because our studies were conducted in the field, we were unable to conduct 
extensive surveys assessing likely mediators of the impact of prosocial bonuses. While the 
beneficial impact of prosocial spending on happiness is well-established [62,86], a key goal for 
future research is to explore underlying mechanisms of the prosocial bonus-performance link, 
with several clear possibilities worthy of investigation. First, prosocial bonuses may lead to the 
strengthening of existing relationships and even the formation of new relationships; such positive 
interpersonal relationships predict job engagement [45, 46] and job satisfaction [47-49]. Second, 
and relatedly, prosocial bonuses might lead to increased cooperation and cohesiveness between 
team members, which can improve team performance in part by encouraging helping behaviors 
[51-55]. Finally, prosocial spending may increase general feelings of reciprocity among 
members of organizations, leading both to greater cooperation and punishment of “shirkers” or 
“free riders” – those employees who are not contributing to the goals of the organization [100-                  
 
 
105]. Future experiments which include both prosocial and personal bonuses while assessing 
these – and other – constructs will add to our understanding of the benefits of prosocial bonuses. 
We note that Experiment 1 included a prosocial bonus condition and a control condition 
but not a personal bonus condition, whereas Experiment 2 included prosocial and personal bonus 
conditions but not a control condition; in addition, Experiment 1 included two levels of bonuses, 
whereas in Experiment 2 the bonus amount was kept constant. These decisions were driven by 
logistics. Our study sites were not interested in including a personal bonus in Experiment 1 but 
did allow us to include two levels of prosocial bonus; they were interested in including both 
personal and prosocial bonuses of a fixed amount but not a control condition in Experiment 2. Of 
clear interest for future research is more systematic and comprehensive variation of all of these 
factors, crossing many bonus levels with both personal and prosocial bonuses. In addition, as we 
noted in Experiment 2, our observations at the team level are low in number (150 participants 
become just 25 teams); scaled-up experiments that utilized more teams would also build on the 
“proof od concept” experiments we present here. 
It would be particularly interesting to examine employees’ sensitivity to bonus levels as a 
function of whether those bonuses are personal or prosocial. Receiving $10 or $20 for oneself is 
likely to lead only to the purchase of one or two additional coffees, and therefore seems unlikely 
to impact employee satisfaction or job performance. Buying a $20 gift for a coworker instead of 
a $10 gift, on the other hand, may encourage people to be even more creative and thoughtful in 
their gift choice, making the experience more impactful for both the giver and the receiver – and 
possibly leading to a bigger return on investment for the organization. More broadly, a $10 
personal bonus from one’s organization may seem like a trifling or insufficient reward, leading 
to a decrease in motivation [71] – “I worked all year and they only gave me $10?” – our results                   
 
 
suggest that the same small sum of money spent prosocially has a markedly different, and 
positive, effect.  
Related to the above, $50 AUS (roughly $25 USD) was not sufficient to increase 
employee satisfaction in Experiment 1, whereas $20 USD was sufficient to increase team 
performance in Experiment 2. We suggest that this difference is likely due to the different form 
that prosocial bonuses took in the two studies. Recent research suggests that face-to-face giving 
has a larger impact on happiness than giving at a distance: not only are people more likely to 
donate money to toward single individuals than to larger organizations [106-107], but the closer 
the link between giver and receiver, the bigger the happiness benefits: people who give money 
others are happier when they give face-to-face rather than remotely, and spending money on 
close friends leads to more happiness than spending on more distant acquaintances [108-109]. As 
a result, it is not surprising that the same amount of money (~$20 USD) goes further in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, given the social nature of the team expenditure compared to 
the relatively impersonal donation to charity. Perhaps even more importantly, whereas in 
Experiment 1 employees were givers only, in Experiment 2 teammates were both givers and 
receivers: for every salesperson who gave a gift, there was a salesperson who received that gift, 
likely another contributor to the greater impact of prosocial bonuses in Experiment 2.  
Importantly, the observed boost in employee satisfaction and happiness only for the $100 AUS 
and not for the $50 AUS in Study 1 helps rule out the possibility that our results are simply due 
to demand effects. Demand effects should have influenced both of the prosocial donation 
conditions (e.g., $50 AUS and $100 AUS) equally. Thus, if employees felt that they should be 
happy after giving, then the boost in happiness would have been observed across all prosocial 
spenders, not just for employees who gave $100.                   
 
 
Our experiments provide evidence for the potential utility of prosocial bonuses, though 
future research is needed.  Given that existing incentive schemes have important drawbacks, it is 
worthwhile to consider creative new approaches to incentivizing employees. That said, we 
assume that prosocial bonuses may have drawbacks of their own, which future research should 
document. In particular, it seems likely that prosocial bonuses could backfire if they were 
introduced by companies as a replacement for more standard bonuses. Because many companies 
already allocate funds for charitable giving and employee entertainment, however, it may be 
possible for companies to reap the benefits of prosocial bonuses by providing some of these 
existing funds directly to employees, who can then use this money to make donations to charity 
or to benefit co-workers—potentially increasing job satisfaction and performance in the process. 
Relatedly, prosocial bonuses were unconditional in our experiments; future research could 
examine whether bonuses conditional on performance or based on competition would prove as 
effective in increasing job satisfaction and performance.  
We opened by noting that recent surveys indicate that employee job satisfaction is at a 
twenty-year low in the United States even as Americans have come to spend more and more of 
their time at work. This additional time at work, of course, often comes at the expense of 
devoting time to pursuits known to be linked to well-being, from forming social connections to 
engaging in prosocial acts such as volunteering [2, 110-111]. We suggest that rather than force 
employees to make a losing tradeoff between social life and work life, employers can focus 
instead on using prosocial bonuses to create a more altruistic, satisfying, and productive 
workplace.                    
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Tables 
Table 1. Employee demographics (Experiment 1) 
Age (years)  %    Income ($AUS)  %  Years at Company  % 
21-29 23.3    $20,001-$50,000  10  <1  14 
30-39 38.3    $50,001-$100,000  42  1-2  18 
40-49 26.3    $100,001-  $150,000  34  3-5  21 
50-59  12    $150,001 - $200,000  11  6-10  12 
      $200,001 - $500,000  3  11-15  12 
         >15  23 
                   
 
 
Table 2. Change in happiness and job satisfaction between Time 1 and Time 2 as a function of 
condition (Experiment 1) 
   Time 1    Time 2 
  Happiness   Job  Satisfaction   Happiness   Job  Satisfaction 
              
Control Condition (N=48)  3.48 (.83)    5.15 (1.50)    3.56 (.80)    5.25 (1.35) 
$50 Condition (N=41)  3.56 (.87)    5.37 (1.61)    3.51 (.95)    5.12 (1.35) 
$100 Condition (N=44)  3.52 (.70)    5.23 (1.29)    3.98 (.51)    5.55 (1.07) 
                 
                   
 
 
Table 3. Change in sports and sales team performance between Time 1 and Time 2 as a function 
of condition (Experiment 2) 
  
 
Time 1 
 
Time 2 
 
 
Sports Teams    
Percentage of 
Games Won   
Sales Teams 
Sales in Euros 
Sports Teams   
Percentage of 
Games Won   
Sales Teams 
Sales in 
Euros 
            
Personal Bonuses   50% (35%)    3928 (2366)  43% (44%)    3938 (2392) 
Prosocial Bonuses  50% (55%)    3336 (2171)  81% (31%)    3525 (2279) 
                  
  